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The standard view of the Bush Administration’s relationship to 
international law is something like this: The Administration did not 
take international law seriously and routinely disregarded it whenever 
it was thought to conflict with the national interests of the country. In 
doing so, the Administration substantially undermined both the rule 
of law and the United States’ standing in the international community. 
Consequently, one of the priorities of the Obama Administration 
should be to recommit the United States to compliance with 
international law and its institutions. 
In support of this view, critics of the Bush Administration invoke a 
variety of examples. First, the Administration withdrew from two 
treaties—the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with Russia, and the 
Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 
which gave the International Court of Justice in The Hague 
jurisdiction over certain disputes relating to the arrest of foreign 
nationals in the United States. Second, the Administration allegedly 
took the unprecedented step of “unsigning” the treaty establishing the 
International Criminal Court. Third, the Administration concluded 
that it would not apply the protections of the Geneva Conventions to 
terrorist detainees, including the detainees held at the Guantanamo 
Bay naval base in Cuba. Fourth, the Administration announced a 
military preemption doctrine, a doctrine that many international 
lawyers think exceeds the international law right of self-defense. Fifth, 
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the United States invaded Iraq in early 2003—an action that many 
regard as a violation of fundamental international law norms 
governing the use of force. Finally, the Administration allegedly 
authorized torture of terrorism suspects, in violation of treaty 
obligations and other international responsibilities. 
This long bill of particulars certainly gives the standard view of the 
Bush Administration’s relationship to international law some 
plausibility. Nevertheless, as I will explain, the standard view is both 
too simplistic and in some ways the reverse of the truth. As an initial 
matter, this view omits from its description some affirmative 
contributions that the Administration made to international law. 
More importantly, this view glosses over the fact that the 
Administration almost never directly repudiated international law 
and in many cases advanced perfectly respectable legal arguments to 
support its controversial actions. 
In light of these complications, I will suggest a lesson from the 
Bush Administration’s relationship with international law that is 
different from the standard view: Most of the problems associated 
with the Administration’s approach to international relations did not 
result from a failure to treat international law as law. In fact, in some 
respects the problems were the result of the opposite—the 
Administration was too focused on the law and failed to take 
adequate account of other, non-legal considerations that are often 
central to good diplomacy. The situation improved during President 
Bush’s second term, as the Administration became more pragmatic, 
and less legalistic, in its approach to international law. 
At the outset, it is important to note that the Administration made 
affirmative contributions to particular areas of international law. 
Consider, for example, the area of nuclear non-proliferation, one of 
the most important issues in the world today. The Administration 
played a leadership role in pushing other nations to comply with and 
help enforce the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and one of the 
Administration’s major foreign policy successes was to persuade 
Libya to agree to give up its nuclear program.1 It also worked with the 
United Nations Security Council to craft several key resolutions 
 
 1. David E. Sanger & Judith Miller, Libya to Give Up Arms Program, Bush Announces, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2003, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/20/world/libya-to-give-
up-arms-programs-bush-announces.html. 
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responding to nuclear activities by North Korea and Iran.2 
Furthermore, it helped launch the “Global Partnership Against the 
Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction,” to which it 
provided billions of dollars in funding.3 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the Bush Administration also made 
significant contributions to international law concerning counter-
terrorism and criminal law enforcement. After the September 11 
attacks, the Administration worked with the Security Council to 
establish a Counter-Terrorism Committee, which has focused on 
restricting the financing of terrorist organizations and making sure 
that nations extradite or prosecute terrorists.4 Concerns have been 
raised about some of the processes used by that Committee, but it is 
nevertheless an important development in the area of international 
law dealing with terrorism. After September 11, the United States also 
persuaded other nations to support the concept of a self-defense right 
in the context of terrorism.5 In terms of law enforcement more 
generally, the United States helped negotiate and conclude important 
treaties on subjects such as cybercrime and organized crime.6 
It is true, of course, that the Administration adopted a number of 
controversial positions relating to international law. But most of these 
positions did not involve repudiations of international law. Indeed, 
most of the Administration’s positions involved perfectly respectable 
legal arguments, and sometimes even involved an almost obsessive 
attention to international legal process. The one exception may be the 
Administration’s approach to the international law on torture, which I 
will discuss in more detail below. 
Consider first the Administration’s treaty withdrawals. 
International law generally allows nations to withdraw from treaties, 
 
 2. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1718, ¶¶ 1, 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1718 (Oct. 14, 2006)  
(condemning North Korean nuclear tests and demanding that North Korea retract its 
withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons); S.C. Res. 1803,  
¶¶ 5–8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1803 (Mar. 3, 2008) (applying trade and other restrictions against Iran 
for refusing to suspend its uranium-enrichment and heavy-water-related projects). 
 3. See Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet: G-8 Summit—Preventing the 
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/ 
official_docs/pres/62702.WMD.pres.pdf (outlining the G-8’s political and monetary commitment 
to preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction). 
 4. S.C. Res. 1373, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1372 (Sept. 28, 2001). 
 5. S.C. Res. 1368, pmbl. U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001). 
 6. Convention on Cybercrime, Council of Europe, Nov. 23, 2001, 41 I.L.M. 282,  
2296 U.N.T.S. 167 (ratified by the United States in 2006); United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime, Nov. 15, 2000, 40 I.L.M. 334, 2225 U.N.T.S. 209. 
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subject in some cases to a notice requirement.7 Moreover, the Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty expressly includes a right of withdrawal upon 
six months notice,8 which the Bush Administration provided prior to 
withdrawing.9 The Administration explained to Russia that the treaty, 
which was originally concluded with the Soviet Union in 1972 during 
the height of the Cold War, no longer made sense in light of changed 
world conditions: the United States and Russia cease to rely on 
mutually assured nuclear destruction as a cornerstone of their foreign 
policy, and the danger that rogue states or terrorists would acquire 
nuclear weapons has increased.10 This is hardly a frivolous position, 
and the Administration was acting in accordance with the treaty’s 
withdrawal provision in articulating it. 
The other treaty from which the United States withdrew, the 
Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 
did not specifically address withdrawal. But it has generally been 
understood that such jurisdictional treaties are subject to 
withdrawal.11 Indeed, many nations have changed or withdrawn their 
consent to the International Court of Justice’s jurisdiction during the 
last sixty years since the Court was created.12 Although the Bush 
Administration withdrew from this treaty in 2004, it sought to comply 
with a judgment of the International Court of Justice that had been 
issued before withdrawal by taking the somewhat surprising step of 
ordering its state courts to provide new hearings for foreign nationals 
in certain death penalty cases.13 The Supreme Court ultimately held in 
Medellin v. Texas that the Administration did not have the domestic 
 
 8. Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems art. 15, U.S.-U.S.S.R.,  
May 26, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 3435. 
 9. George W. Bush, Remarks Announcing the United States Withdrawal from the  
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, 37 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 1783 (Dec. 13, 2001). 
 10. See id. (“Today, as the events of September the 11th made all too clear, the greatest 
threats, to both our countries come not from each other or other big powers in the world but 
from terrorists who strike without warning or rogue states who seek weapons of mass 
destruction.”). 
 11. See, e.g., ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 291 (2d ed. 2007) 
(“It will usually be possible to withdraw from a general treaty for the settlement of disputes 
between the parties even when it has no withdrawal provision.”). 
 12. See id. (“[S]tates have withdrawn from such optional dispute settlement protocols to 
several United Nations treaties without (at least legal) objection, even when they contain no 
provision for this; and declarations under Article 36 of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice (which is an integral part of the UN Charter) can be, and have been, withdrawn.”). 
 13. See Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1353 (2008) (referring to President Bush’s 
memorandum to the Attorney General charging state courts to “give effect” to the 
International Court of Justice’s decision). 
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authority to issue this order.14 Whatever this episode might reveal 
about the Administration’s conception of executive power, it does not 
reveal an administration simply ignoring international law. 
What about the United States’ “unsigning” of the International 
Criminal Court treaty? Nations typically join multilateral treaties 
such as this one through ratification, which traditionally requires 
depositing an instrument of ratification with the United Nations. A 
nation’s signature on such a treaty does not make the nation a party; 
the signature only suggests (at most) that the treaty is acceptable to 
the nation’s executive branch. It is understood that in many nations, 
including in the United States, legislative approval may be required 
before the nation can actually join the treaty.15 
The Clinton Administration signed the treaty establishing the 
International Criminal Court on December 31, 2000, about two weeks 
before President Clinton left office.16 President Clinton stated that he 
had some significant reservations about the treaty and did not expect 
the United States to move towards ratification any time soon, but he 
thought it nevertheless important for the United States to be a 
signatory.17 In 2002, the Bush Administration sent a letter to the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations stating that the United 
States did not intend to become a party to the treaty and that there 
should be no continuing legal effects associated with the Clinton 
Administration’s signature.18 
The Bush Administration did not attempt to physically remove 
the U.S. signature from the treaty. It merely announced its intention 
not to become a party to the treaty. This act was not only perfectly 
legal under international law, it actually followed the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, which governs topics such as 
signing and withdrawal from treaties, to the letter. Article 18(a) of the 
Convention provides that if a nation has signed a treaty, it is obliged 
not to engage in acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the 
 
 14. Id. at 1367–72. 
 15. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, Unratified Treaties, Domestic Politics, and the U.S. 
Constitution, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 307, 313 (2007). 
 16. See William J. Clinton, Statement on the Rome Treaty on the International Criminal 
Court, 37 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 4 (Dec. 31, 2000) (statement of the President on December 
31, 2000, detailing the treaty and the United States’ reasons for signing it; President Clinton 
vacated office in January, 2001). 
 17. Id. 
 18. See Curtis A. Bradley, U.S. Announces Intent Not to Ratify International Criminal 
Court Treaty, ASIL INSIGHTS, May 2002, http://www.asil.org/insigh87.cfm#_edn4. 
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treaty “until it shall have made its intention clear not to become a 
party to the treaty.”19 It is hard to imagine a way to make a country’s 
intention clearer than to send a public letter to the United Nations 
Secretary-General, who serves as the depository for many multilateral 
treaties, including the International Criminal Court treaty. 
One can of course debate the policy wisdom of disassociating the 
United States from the International Criminal Court, an institution 
currently supported by over 100 nations. The central concern of the 
United States, expressed by both the Clinton and Bush 
Administrations, was that the Court could be used as a political device 
against the United States through biased investigations and 
prosecutions relating to United States military activities abroad.20 This 
concern may be overblown given a variety of safeguards in the 
treaty.21 But the key point is that the Bush Administration did not 
contravene or disregard international law; rather, it carefully followed 
international law governing “unsigning.” Nor, it should be noted, did 
the Bush Administration oppose all international criminal law 
enforcement. It was a significant supporter of the International 
Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone, and it even acquiesced in the Security 
Council’s referral of the Darfur genocide case to the International 
Criminal Court.22 The Bush Administration therefore was not 
antagonistic to international criminal law, but instead simply had 
particular concerns about the structure of the International Criminal 
Court, concerns that also had been expressed by the Clinton 
Administration. 
Another example that is supposed to show the Bush 
Administration’s disregard of international law is the 
 
 19. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 18(a), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
 20. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 18 (quoting the Bush Administration’s concern that the 
International Criminal Court lacks any “effective mechanism to prevent politicized prosecutions 
of American service members and officials”); Statement on the Rome Treaty on the 
International Criminal Court, supra note 16 (including among President Clinton’s concerns 
“protect[ing] U.S. officials from unfounded charges”). 
 21. See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 17, 20, July 17, 1998,  
27 I.L.M. 999 (regulating the discretion of the prosecutor in bringing cases before the 
International Criminal Court). 
 22. See, e.g., Michael Abramowitz & Colum Lynch, Darfur Killings Soften Bush’s 
Opposition to International Court, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 2008, available at http:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/10/11/AR2008101101964.html; Warren 
Hoge, U.N. Votes to Send Any Sudan War Crime Suspects to World Court, N.Y. TIMES,  
Apr. 1, 2005, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E0DE4D8103 
FF932A35757C0A9639C8B63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all. 
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Administration’s detention policy in the War on Terror, which critics 
have argued violates the Geneva Conventions. The Geneva 
Conventions are four treaties that were negotiated after World War II. 
The treaty that is most often discussed in the context of the War on 
Terror is the Third Geneva Convention, which addresses the 
treatment of prisoners of war (POWs).23 The Bush Administration’s 
position has been that this treaty does not apply to the conflict with 
Al Qaeda and that, although it does arguably apply to the conflict 
with the Taliban in Afghanistan, Taliban fighters do not qualify for the 
protections accorded under the treaty to prisoners of war.24 
The Administration’s position at least with respect to the 
worldwide conflict with Al Qaeda has a strong legal basis. The Third 
Geneva Convention for the most part applies only to conflicts with 
contracting parties,25 and Al Qaeda is not a contracting party and does 
not itself observe the Convention. Importantly, even in this context 
the Administration did not ignore or attempt to minimize the 
importance of the Geneva Conventions. Indeed, President Bush’s 
February 2002 memorandum announcing the U.S. position with 
respect to the applicability of the Conventions to the War on Terror 
made clear that the United States “has been and continues to be a 
strong supporter of Geneva and its principles,” and that, even though 
the detainees were not technically entitled to the protections of the 
Conventions, the United States would, “to the extent appropriate and 
consistent with military necessity,” treat the detainees “in a manner 
consistent with the principles of Geneva.”26 
The Administration’s legal position with respect to the Taliban is 
more debatable than with respect to Al Qaeda, since Afghanistan is a 
party to the Convention and Taliban fighters served as the ruling 
government’s armed forces there. The language of the Third Geneva 
Convention suggests that a contracting party’s armed forces 
automatically qualify for POW protection, whereas militias and 
irregular forces need to meet certain requirements such as wearing 
uniforms, having a command structure, and complying with the laws 
 
 23. Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 
[1955] 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]. 
 24. Memorandum from President George W. Bush to Vice President Dick Cheney et al., 
Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees, ¶ 2d (Feb. 7, 2002), available at 
http://www.pegc.us/archive/White_House/bush_memo_20020207_ed.pdf. 
 25. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 23, at art. 2. 
 26. Memorandum from George W. Bush, supra note 24, ¶¶ 1, 3, 5. 
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of war in order to qualify for POW protection.27 However, law of war 
treaties that predate the Geneva Conventions, and which the 
Conventions built upon, provide some support for the conclusion that 
the Conventions’ reference to a party’s armed forces implicitly 
includes those requirements, in which case the Taliban would have to 
comply with them in order to qualify as POWs.28 This was the 
Administration’s position, and it is at least plausible. In addition to 
having some historical support, this reading would provide an 
incentive for regular forces to follow these requirements and thus, for 
example, adequately distinguish themselves from civilians, which is a 
fundamental component of the laws of war. 
I do not mean to suggest that it was wise for the Administration to 
adopt this interpretation with respect to Taliban fighters, and, indeed, 
my view is that the Administration would have been wiser to embrace 
more of the Geneva Conventions than it thought was technically 
required. This is what the United States government did during the 
Vietnam War—voluntarily applying the Geneva Conventions even to 
irregular Viet Cong fighters.29 
In any event, it is important to keep in mind that even if the 
Taliban fighters were entitled to POW protections, the Third Geneva 
Convention would not bar their detention. Under that Convention, 
prisoners may be held until the end of hostilities,30 and there continues 
to be fighting between the United States and the Taliban even today. 
So, even if the Administration violated the Geneva Conventions with 
respect to specific actions such as coercive interrogations or military 
 
 27. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 23, at art. 4(A)(1)–(2). 
 28. See, e.g., MICHAEL BOTHE ET AL., NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: 
COMMENTARY ON THE TWO 1977 PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS 
OF 1949 at 234–35 (1982) (“It is generally assumed that these conditions were deemed, by the 
1874 Brussels Conference and the 1899 and 1907 Hague Peace Conferences, to be inherent in 
the regular armed forces of States. Accordingly, it was considered to be unnecessary and 
redundant to spell them out in the [Geneva] Conventions.”); INGRID DETTER, THE LAW OF 
WAR 136–37 (2d ed. 2000) (expressing similar view); United States v. Lindh,  
212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 557 n.34 (E.D. Va. 2002) (same). 
 29. See GEOFFREY BEST, WAR AND LAW SINCE 1945 at 363 (1994) (detailing the United 
States’ application of the Geneva Conventions during the Vietnam War). 
 30. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 23, at art. 118 (“Prisoners of war shall be 
released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities.”); see also  
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 520 (2004) (plurality opinion) (“It is a clearly established 
principle of the law of war that detention may last no longer than active hostilities.”);  
Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 
118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2096 (2005) (“[B]oth lawful combatants who qualify for prisoner-of-
war status and unlawful combatants who do not can, under the laws of war, be detained until the 
end of active hostilities.”). 
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tribunals, its general detention policy is not necessarily at odds with 
the Conventions. 
There are two provisions in the Third Geneva Convention that 
pose special issues concerning U.S. compliance. First, Common  
Article 3, a provision iterated in all four Geneva Conventions, confers 
certain minimum protections on individuals detained in an armed 
conflict occurring in the territory of a contracting party, and does not 
apply only to conflicts between contracting parties.31 This Article, 
however, is limited to “conflicts not of an international character,”32 
and, until 2006, the Bush Administration’s position was that the 
conflicts, both between the United States and Al Qaeda, and between 
the United States and the Taliban, were international conflicts 
because they were not simply internal to a nation. 
The Supreme Court ultimately disagreed with this reading of 
Common Article 3 in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.33 The Court concluded 
that “international” conflicts meant conflicts between nations—inter-
national—rather than cross-border, and thus that the conflict with Al 
Qaeda was not of an international character, since Al Qaeda is not a 
nation.34 The Administration’s position, however, was reasonable as a 
legal matter, and indeed finds support in the original International 
Committee for the Red Cross commentary on Common Article 3, 
which suggests that it covers only internal conflicts such as 
insurgencies and civil wars.35 In any event, Common Article 3 does not 
call into question the Administration’s general detention policy, as 
opposed to its use of military tribunals. 
The other provision in the Third Geneva Convention that poses a 
special issue is Article 5, which provides that when there is any doubt 
about whether captured individuals qualify for POW status, they shall 
be treated as POWs until their status is determined by a competent 
tribunal.36 In failing to provide such competent tribunal hearings to 
 
 31. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 23, at art. 3(1)(A) (listing prohibitions against 
“violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and 
torture”). 
 32. Id. at art. 3. 
 33. Hamdan v. Rumseld, 548 U.S. 557, 630–31 (2006). 
 34. Id. 
 35. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON III 
GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 37  
(Jean S. Pictet ed., 1960) (stating that the conflicts covered by Common Article 3 are conflicts 
that “take place within the confines of a single country”). 
 36. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 23, at art. 5. 
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captured Taliban fighters, the Administration took the fairly 
aggressive position that, since the Taliban as a class did not wear 
adequate uniforms and did not comply with the laws of war, there was 
no need for individualized hearings about POW status.37 
There is a certain logic to the Administration’s position: Why have 
individualized hearings when the problem with POW status was legal 
rather than factual? Nevertheless, this is another instance where the 
Administration probably should have embraced more of the Geneva 
Conventions than it thought was technically required, since the cost of 
these hearings would have been low and the Supreme Court 
eventually required the Administration to provide individualized 
hearings anyway. The State Department’s Legal Adviser did argue 
within the Administration for POW status hearings for people 
captured in Afghanistan, but his advice was rejected.38 This rejection 
occurred in 2002 at a time when there was a tense relationship 
between the State Department and the Office of Legal Counsel 
(OLC) over War on Terror issues. John Yoo of the OLC had informed 
the State Department that the OLC believed that the Geneva 
Conventions had no application in either Afghanistan or the War on 
Terror more generally, reasoning, among other things, that 
Afghanistan was a “failed state” and thus no longer effectively a party 
to the Conventions.39 In response, Will Taft, the State Department 
Legal Adviser at the time, sent a long memo to John Yoo critiquing 
the OLC’s analysis, and Taft included a note stating that “the most 
important factual assumptions on which your draft is based as well as 
its legal analysis are seriously flawed.”40 
President Bush never invoked the “failed state” theory that had 
been proposed by the OLC, which suggests that the State 
 
 37. Memorandum from President George W. Bush to Vice President Cheney et al, 
Humane Treatment of Taliban and al Qaeda Detainees, ¶ 2d (Feb. 7, 2002), available at 
http://www.pegc.us/archive/White_House/bush_memo_20020207_ed.pdf. 
 38. Memorandum from William H. Taft, IV, Legal Adviser to the Department of State, to 
Counsel to the President, Comments on your Paper on the Geneva Convention (Feb. 2, 2002), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/packages/html/politics/20040608_DOC.pdf. 
 39. Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal 
Counsel, to William J. Haynes II, General Counsel, Department of Defense, Application of 
Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Jan. 9, 2002), available at 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.01.09.pdf. 
 40. Memorandum from William H. Taft, IV, Legal Adviser to the Department of State, to 
John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Your Draft 
Memorandum of January 9 (Jan. 11, 2002), http://www.torturingdemocracy.org/documents/ 
20020111.pdf (last visited May 20, 2009). 
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Department’s dialogue with the OLC did have an effect, even during 
this tense period. The key point, again, is that the Administration as a 
whole was taking express account of international law and was 
ultimately adopting plausible interpretations of that law. 
Still another controversial example of the Administration’s 
treatment of international law is the Bush Doctrine on military 
preemption. In September 2002, the Bush Administration issued a 
policy paper that expressed the view that nations have the ability to 
take preemptive military action to prevent the use of weapons of 
mass destruction.41 Some commentators have argued that this position 
violates the Charter of the United Nations, a treaty established in 
1945 that is binding upon essentially all nations, including the United 
States.42 
Article 51 of the Charter recognizes the inherent right to use 
military force in self-defense in response to an armed attack,43 but it 
does not expressly contemplate the use of force to preempt an 
attack.44 Nevertheless, there is a plausible argument that Article 51 
leaves some room for preemptive military measures. In stating that 
“[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defense,” Article 51 suggests that the 
Charter is not intended to override the historic right of self-defense.45 
That historic right arguably includes a right of anticipatory self-
defense in response to imminent threats.46 Interestingly, the 
Administration specifically invoked this historic right under 
customary international law as justification for its policy of 
preemption. The policy paper on the use of preemptive force stated, 
for example: 
For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not 
suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend 
themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of 
attack. Legal scholars and international jurists often conditioned 
 
 41. THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICA (2002), available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/national/ 
nss-020920.pdf. 
 42. See, e.g., Thomas M. Franck, What Happens Now? The United Nations After Iraq,  
97 AM. J. INT’L L. 607, 620 (2003). 
 43. U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 44. See id. (referring only to a right of self-defense in the event of an armed attack). 
 45. U.N. Charter art. 51 (emphasis added). 
 46. E.g., THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST THREATS 
AND ARMED ATTACKS ch. 7 (2002). 
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the legitimacy of preemption on the existence of an imminent 
threat—most often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air 
forces preparing to attack. 
We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities 
and objectives of today’s adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists 
do not seek to attack us using conventional means. They know 
such attacks would fail. Instead, they rely on acts of terror and, 
potentially, the use of weapons of mass destruction—weapons that 
can be easily concealed, delivered covertly, and used without 
warning.47 
This argument may or may not be convincing, but it is an argument 
that expressly attempts to work with, rather than ignore, international 
law. 
We move into even more controversial terrain when we consider 
the Administration’s justifications for the Iraq War. It is important to 
note that the Bush Doctrine on preemption, although announced 
prior to the Iraq War, was not the Administration’s principal legal 
argument justifying the war. This is fortunate for the Administration, 
since weapons of mass destruction were never actually found in Iraq. 
The principal legal argument, rather, was based on Security Council 
resolutions.48 Under international law, a nation may use military force 
against another nation either in self-defense49 or with the 
authorization of the United Nations Security Council.50 
The Security Council had authorized the use of force against Iraq 
in the Gulf War in 1991, after Iraq invaded Kuwait.51 After coalition 
forces expelled Iraq from Kuwait, the Security Council issued a 
ceasefire resolution that was dependent upon Iraq’s compliance with 
a variety of conditions.52 These conditions included destroying various 
types of weapons, agreeing not to develop certain weapons, respecting 
designated no-fly zones, and subjecting itself to inspections and 
monitoring for compliance with the outlined conditions. Several years 
passed and Iraq repeatedly breached the terms of the cease-fire 
 
 47. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 41, at 15. 
 48. George W. Bush, U.N. General Assembly in New York City Address (Sept. 12, 2002), 
38 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 1529 (Sept. 16, 2002). 
 49. U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 50. U.N. Charter art. 42. 
 51. S.C. Res. 678, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (Nov. 29, 1990). 
 52. S.C. Res. 687, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (Apr. 3, 1991). 
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resolution.53 At times, United States and British forces retaliated 
through air attacks on select facilities, with no complaint from the 
United Nations.54 Furthermore, Iraq was so uncooperative in 
complying with the mandatory inspections that the inspectors 
abandoned their efforts and left Iraq in 1998. Following their 
departure, the Clinton Administration, along with forces from Great 
Britain, orchestrated a three-day bombing campaign designed to 
reduce Iraq’s ability to develop weapons of mass destruction.55 
Inspections were later resumed, but again there were significant 
problems with Iraqi cooperation. In November 2002, after weeks of 
drafting and negotiation, the Security Council issued Resolution 1441 
stating that Iraq was in “material breach” of its obligations under 
prior resolutions.56 Resolution 1441 gave Iraq a “final opportunity” for 
compliance57 and stated that failure to comply would result in “serious 
consequences.”58 In the months preceding the Iraq War, there 
continued to be difficulties with Iraqi cooperation, although the 
extent of these difficulties is contested. 
In light of this history, there was a respectable legal argument that 
the Security Council’s original authorization of force was reinstated in 
light of Iraq’s material breaches of the ceasefire resolution and 
subsequent resolutions. The Security Council seemed to envision this 
possibility in its use of phrases such as “final opportunity” and “facing 
serious consequences” in Resolution 1441.59 In fact, Resolution 1441 
was issued by the Security Council in November 2002, just one month 
after Congress publicly authorized President Bush to pursue a war in 
Iraq should the violations continue. To be clear, my own view is that 
the case against legality is somewhat stronger than the case for 
legality. But the case for legality is not insubstantial, and it is too 
simplistic to say that the Administration was simply disregarding 
international law. 
 
 53. See BARRY E. CARTER, PHILIP R. TRIMBLE, AND ALLEN S. WEINER, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 1058 (5th ed. 2007) (detailing Iraq’s breaches of Security Council resolutions). 
 54. See William H. Taft, IV, & Todd F. Buchwald, Preemption, Iraq and International Law, 
97 AM. J. INT’L L. 557, 559–60 (2003) (outlining several 1990s military campaigns against Iraq 
and arguing for their legality). 
 55. See id. (detailing operation “Desert Fox” aimed at Iraq). 
 56. S.C. Res. 1441, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441 (Nov. 8, 2002) (listing in the preamble 
several examples of Iraq’s “material breach” of resolution obligations including not cooperating 
with weapons inspectors and not making significant disclosures of weapons programs). 
 57. Id. ¶ 2. 
 58. Id. ¶ 13. 
 59. Taft & Buchwald, supra note 54, at 563. 
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The final example to consider, and probably the most 
controversial issue involving the Bush Administration’s treatment of 
international law, is that of torture. The United States has been a party 
to the Convention Against Torture since 1994, and many courts and 
commentators believe that torture also violates unwritten norms of 
international law.60 In a memo that was subsequently leaked to the 
press, the OLC infamously adopted in August 2002 a very narrow 
definition of torture, reasoning that for an act to constitute torture, 
the resulting physical pain must be “equivalent in intensity to the pain 
accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, 
impairment of bodily functions, or even death,” and for mental harm 
to constitute torture, “it must result in significant psychological harm 
of significant duration.”61 
The August 2002 memo contains problematic legal reasoning, 
especially because the OLC failed to take adequate account of how 
other parties to the treaty understand torture. Nevertheless, although 
the existence of this memo may tell us a lot about problems with the 
OLC culture during this period, I do not think it warrants general 
claims about the Administration’s relationship with international law, 
for several reasons. 
First, unlike essentially all other international law decisions made 
by the Bush Administration, the analysis in this memo did not involve 
any participation by the State Department, which is the part of the 
Executive Branch with the most expertise on international law. The 
lack of consultation with the State Department concerning an 
important issue of international may itself be worthy of 
condemnation, but it was not a characteristic of any of the other 
issues discussed in this essay. Second, despite some broad and 
unnecessary analysis in the memo about how President Bush had the 
domestic power to authorize torture, the President never in fact 
claimed such a power and in fact insisted that any instances of torture 
should be prosecuted.62 That is, the President did not attempt to 
 
 60. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 883–85 (2d Cir. 1980) (concluding that 
torture, when carried out by a government actor, violates customary international law). 
 61. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., to Alberto Gonzales, Counsel 
to the President, RE: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A 
(Aug. 1, 2002), in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB (Karen J. Greenberg & 
Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005), also available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/etn/ 
gonzales/memos_dir/memo_20020801_JD_%20Gonz_.pdf. 
 62. See, e.g., George W. Bush, Statement on United Nations International Day in Support 
of Victims of Torture, 40 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 1167, 1167–68 (July 5, 2004)  
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override, or simply disregard, international law. Attempting to read a 
legal prohibition narrowly may be problematic, but it is not the same 
thing as disregarding the prohibition or treating it as if it were not law. 
Third, unlike other controversial international law positions advanced 
by the Administration, the Administration did not stand by the 
analysis in this memo once its flaws became apparent—instead, the 
Department of Justice withdrew the memo and replaced it with a 
much more defensible analysis in 2004.63 This further suggests the sui 
generis nature of the torture issue. 
The Administration’s actual practice with respect to torture 
deserves some further explication. We can all recall the abuses that 
came to light at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, which, if not torture, at 
the very least involved degrading treatment of prisoners.64 Whatever 
this abuse may tell us about lapses in the chain of command, however, 
the prisoners’ treatment was not the direct result of any 
Administration position regarding international law: the 
Administration accepted the applicability of the Third Geneva 
Convention in Iraq from the start.65 The Convention bars all 
mistreatment of prisoners, not just torture, and some soldiers were 
criminally prosecuted for the Abu Ghraib abuse. Similarly, it is far 
from clear that the interrogation techniques authorized for use at 
Guantanamo, the most aggressive of which involved isolation and 
changing sleep patterns, amount to torture (which the Convention 
Against Torture defines as involving the intentional infliction of 
severe pain and suffering).66 
So did the Administration ever authorize torture? Reports suggest 
that the CIA was authorized to use so-called “enhanced” 
interrogation techniques against a number of high-level Al Qaeda 
 
(“America stands against and will not tolerate torture. We will investigate and prosecute all acts 
of torture.”). 
 63. Legal Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A, Op. Att’y Gen.  
(Dec. 30, 2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/18usc23402340a2.htm. 
 64. See, e.g., Seymour M. Hersh, Torture at Abu Ghraib, THE NEW YORKER, May 10, 2004, 
available at http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2004/05/10/040510fa_fact (detailing the abuses at 
Abu Ghraib). 
 65. U.S. Dept. of Defense, News Transcript, Defense Department Background Briefing 
(May 14, 2004), http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr20040514-0752.html (last visited 
May 20, 2009). 
 66. News Release No. 596-04, U.S. Dept. of Defense, DOD Provides Details on 
Interrogation Process (June 22, 2004), available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/dod/ 
nr20040622-0930.htm; Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense for the Commander, U.S. 
Southern Command, Counter-Resistance Techniques in the War on Terrorism (April 16, 2003), 
available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/dod/d20040622doc9.pdf. 
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detainees, including slapping, forced standing for long periods, light 
and noise bombardment, and, for three of the detainees, 
waterboarding.67 Of these enhanced techniques, many people consider 
at least waterboarding to constitute torture.68 If so, then the 
Administration did violate international law in those select instances, 
although the CIA had been given reason to believe, based on the 
problematic OLC memo, that the technique did not violate the 
international ban on torture. But, by themselves, these individual 
instances no more elucidate the Bush Administration’s general 
relationship with international law than, for example, President 
Clinton’s bombing campaign in Kosovo (which also probably violated 
international law) tells us about the general relationship of the 
Clinton Administration to international law. 
* * * 
In sum, despite caricatures about the Bush Administration’s 
failure to treat international law as law or ignoring it altogether, the 
Administration actually made some important contributions to 
international law and generally—although admittedly not always—
adopted defensible international law positions with respect to its 
controversial actions. 
One might respond to these points by contending that even if the 
Administration did not disregard international law, it nevertheless 
displayed a lack of “good faith” towards international law. It is far 
from clear, however, that the concept of good faith is violated simply 
because a nation decides not to be a party to particular international 
instruments or institutions, or decides not to embrace the most 
expansive interpretations of their scope—actions that could instead 
simply reflect a good faith policy disagreement. To the extent that the 
charge of bad faith assumes that having more, and more expansive, 
international rules is always better for the world, this is at best an 
under-defended assumption. Moreover, a charge that the 
Administration did not apply international law in a sufficiently robust 
 
 67. Greg Miller, CIA Chief Confirms Use of Waterboarding, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2008, 
available at http://articles.latimes.com/2008/feb/06/nation/na-terror6; Jon Ward & John 
Solomon, Interview of the Vice-President, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2008, available at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr20040514-0752.html. 
 68. See, e.g., Poll Results: Waterboarding is Torture, CNN.COM, Nov. 6, 2007, 
http://www.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/11/06/waterboard.poll/ (“Asked whether they think 
waterboarding is a form of torture, more than two-thirds of respondents, or 69 percent, said 
yes.”). 
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way is a different charge, and is less obviously an inherent indictment, 
than the more common charge that the Administration ignored 
international law or did not take it seriously as law, especially since 
the Administration generally made at least plausible international law 
arguments. 
Despite these contentions, my goal here is not to applaud the 
Bush Administration’s approach to international relations more 
generally. I will concede that there were significant problems with the 
Administration’s approach to international relations, especially during 
the Administration’s first term, but my argument is that these 
problems did not particularly involve a disregard for international 
law. Instead, I shall go even further and suggest that the problem at 
times was that the Administration was too focused on law and that it 
neglected other non-legal considerations that are at least as important 
in the international arena. 
One of the lessons from the Bush Administration, I want to 
suggest, is that the importance of international law does not lie solely, 
or even chiefly, in technical legal argumentation. Instead, it is 
intertwined with less legalistic considerations of credibility, 
engagement, and persuasion—considerations that are fundamental to 
the exercise of what Joseph Nye has famously called “soft power.”69 
Soft power is the ability to have other nations support or acquiesce in 
your policies without being induced by either military or economic 
pressure or rewards—that is, by resorting to hard power.70 This soft 
power strategy does not always work, of course, but when it does it is 
generally a much less expensive way of obtaining foreign policy 
success than using hard power.71 Moreover, hard power is more costly 
and less effective if it lacks broad international support, something 
painfully illustrated when comparing the original Gulf War to the 
current Iraq War. To be sure, it is helpful to have diplomacy backed up 
by hard power, but good diplomacy also requires patience, 
understatement, and a willingness to listen, and those qualities were 
often in short supply in the Bush Administration. 
Instead, the Bush Administration, especially during the first term, 
often gave the impression that it did not need to explain itself or 
 
 69. See generally JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD 
POLITICS (2005). 
 70. E.g., id. 
 71. Id. at 5. 
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listen to others. It lashed out not only at adversaries, but also at allies 
that disagreed with it. This is illustrated by Secretary of State Donald 
Rumsfeld’s dismissive reference to France and Germany as “old 
Europe”72 and by David Addington, Vice-President Cheney’s counsel, 
repeatedly remarking in meetings that foreign governments “don’t 
have a vote.”73 The Administration also appointed John Bolton as 
Ambassador to the United Nations despite his open hostility to the 
institution. Furthermore, the Administration did not just decline to 
join the International Criminal Court treaty but actively sought to 
undermine the Court by pressuring countries that had joined it to 
make agreements that were arguably inconsistent with their 
obligations under the treaty.74 
In relying on technical legal arguments about the Geneva 
Conventions, the Administration did not sufficiently take account of 
the symbolic value of the Conventions. It therefore neglected an 
opportunity to adopt positions that might be more generous than are 
compelled by a narrow reading of the law and thus to exercise a form 
of moral leadership. Its treatment of the Geneva Conventions also 
illustrated how the Administration was quick to find gaps in the law 
but slow to fill those gaps. Particularly when dealing with potentially 
indefinite detention, this situation of “no law” was not going to be 
acceptable either to our allies or to the courts, and good lawyers, as 
well as good policymakers, should have foreseen that. 
The problems associated with the Administration’s excessive focus 
on law likely extend well beyond international relations. Although the 
rule of law promotes important values, framing questions in legal 
terms can sometimes produce undesirable outcomes, even in the 
domestic realm. Among other things, when the focus is on what the 
law allows, there may be an insufficient focus on the underlying policy 
and moral questions, and there may be undue deference to lawyers, 
who may lack relevant policy or moral expertise. This is arguably what 
 
 72. Outrage at “Old Europe” Remarks, BBC NEWS ONLINE, Jan. 23, 2003, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2687403.stm (last visited May 20, 2009). 
 73. JACK L. GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE 
BUSH ADMINISTRATION 126 (2007). 
 74. E.g., James Crawford, Philippe Sands & Ralph Wilde, Joint Opinion, In the Matter of 
the Statute of the International Criminal Court and In the Matter of Bilateral Agreements 
Sought by the United States Under Article 98(2) of the Statute (June 5, 2003), available at 
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happened as the Bush Administration began crafting its approach to 
the War on Terrorism.75 
The Administration performed better on these “soft power” issues 
in President Bush’s second term. The State Department’s Legal 
Adviser, John Bellinger, gave a number of important speeches abroad 
both confirming United States support for international law and 
explaining and defending in some detail the Administration’s specific 
positions on questions of international law.76 He even bravely 
appeared before the U.N. Committee Against Torture in 2006 to 
address criticisms of U.S. practices.77 The Administration also was 
more receptive to dialogue, even with adversaries such as North 
Korea and Iran, a big change from its “axis of evil” speech.78 
None of this is to suggest that the United States should concede 
away its fundamental interests or values in order to please other 
countries. Presidents, regardless of their party affiliation, presumably 
will not do that. For that reason, my guess is that those who are 
assuming that President Obama will have radically different 
substantive positions on foreign policy than Bush may be 
disappointed. But process and tone also matter a great deal in 
international relations, and those considerations probably will change 
for the better in the Obama Administration, just as they started to 
change for the better in President Bush’s second term. 
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